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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Machados have no objection to the Nature of the Case and the Course of the
Proceedings as set forth by the Ryans and the Joneses.

The Yiachados offer the following

additional facts for the Court's consideration.
1.

336,

Dickinson was paid by Timberland to put in Flat Creek Road. R. Vol. 2, p.

15.
2.

Dickinson also put in the logging road that was later to become known as the

Machados' driveway. Clifton testified that there were no roads on the property at the time he
purchased it. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 2. LL. 9-10. Kevin Anderson also testified there were no roads in
that area. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 1189-1190, LL. 22-1.
3.

The Andersons testified that they used a road in the 1950s to access their

property. Tr. Vol. 1,p. 511, LL. 1-15. WhethertheroadusedbytheAndersonsexistedinthe
1950s is of no consequence to this dispute. The Anderson prope1iy is to the north and the
eastofthe Machado/Cliftonproperty(Jd; Tr. Vol. 2.p. 1178, LL. 14-21,p. 1175, LL. 17-22,

p. 1182, LL. 1-5 and p. 1183, LL. 7-16. ); whereas, the Ryan and Jones property is the west
and the south of the Machado/Clifton property.
4.

The Moaks had one mobile home on their property. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 668-669,

LL. 22-4.

[I]

5.

Exhibit D does not show a road going across section 19 in the approximate

location of the Machados driveway, but in the approximate location of Flat Creek Road.

Def's Trial Ex. D.
6.

The marketing materials that Timberland showed to prospective property

purchasers were never recorded. De.f's Trial Exs. KKK, lll, MMM and 000.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT DETERMINING THAT AN

IMPLIED EASEMENT BY PRIOR USE EXISTS.

B.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT DETERMINING THAT A

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXISTS.

Ill. ARGUMENT
This Court exercises free review of the district court's conclusions of law. Coward v.

Hadley, 246 P.3d 391, 395 (2010) The Supreme Court freely reviews the question of whether
the facts found are sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied
easement. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009) In this case, the
facts as found by the District Court are not sufficient to satisfy each of the legal requirements of
any of the theories of easement asserted by the Ryans and Joneses. The District Court's ruling
should be reversed.

[2]

A. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE.

1. THE RYANS Ar'\ID JONES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
FACTS NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO GRANT AN
EASEMENT IMPLIED BY PRIOR USE.
In order to establish an implied easement by pnor use. the party asserting the
easement must prove three elements: ( 1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent
separation by grant of the dominant estate: (2) apparent continuous use long enough before
separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3)
the casement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.

Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006); Davis v. Peacock, 133
Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999); Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 46,205 P.3d
1175, 1182 (2009); Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130
P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006).

It is undisputed that there was unity of title by Timberland

Resources, Inc. However, the Ryans and the Joneses have not proved each of the three
required elements.
There was not continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to
show that the use was intended to be permanent. There was no use prior to separation.
Timberland Resources, Inc. ("Timberland'') purchased the subject property in November of
1970. R. Vol. 2, p. 335, i 2. Richard W. Clifton ("Clifton") obtained a portion of the subject
1

property on December 22, 1970. R. Vol. 2. p. 338, 'j\4.
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Clarence Thomason testified that

"Flat Creek Road was partially pioneered in the spring (sic) of 1971, and at that time he mel
c1

man (Monty Dickinson) who was using a caterpillar to budd Flat Creek Road and other

access roads into every ten acre parcel that was owned by Timberland.'' R. Vol. 2, p. ]36. ~4.
However, in the spring of J 971 Timberland no longer owned all the acre parcels in section
19. Clifton owned rwenty of those acres. Clifton testified that he instructed Dickinson how

to re\ocate Fial Creek Road into his proper1y. Tr. Vol. J, p. 47. LL. 7-24.

Even though,

Timberland Resources may have paid Dickinson by trade, Timberland has no say about what
happened on Clifton's property. Timberland had already sold Clifton's parcel. Timberland
conducted a survey after Dickinson had constructed the roads . The survey was recorded in
August of! 971 1• R. Vol. 2. p. 336, ~3.
PriM to Dickinson building the roads, there were no roads on the subject property.
Therefore, there can be no use of the roads prior to the separation of Clifton' s parcel. The
e lemenls of an imp Iied easement cannot be met.
The Joneses and the Ryans argue that a road existed m 1950 and that Forrest and
Everett Anderson used the road to access their property. Even if this is 1rue2, access to the
Anderson property prior to separation of the Clifton parcel may get the Anderson's an
implied easement ; however, it won't get the Joneses and Ryans an implied easement.

' The survey (Defendan1s Exhibit D) depicts a road encering sec!ion 19 from che southeas1 corner and exiting section
19 a long the 11011hwes1 section I ine.
~ Forrest Anderson firsr cescificd that the road ei.,:isred going 10 the Anderson propeny 10 the north. Tr. Vol. I. p 511,
LL. 1-16. Later, Mr. Anderson recanted that testimony and said Chai he assumed the road was there but he cooldn 1 1
remember. Tr. Vol. I, p. 516. LL 9-25 . Kevin Anderson testified that 1here were no roads a1 that lime. Tr. Vol. 2,
pp. / 189-//90. LL. 22-21 . B01h men were very young in 1he 1950's.

J4J

Anderson's prope1iy is to the north and the east of the Clifton parcel and the Joneses and the
Ryans are to the west of the Clifton parcel.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that any use of a pre-existing road by
the Andersons was apparent and continuous long enough to show that the use was intended
to be permanent. The District Court committed error in failing to grant the Ryans and the
Joneses an easement implied by prior use.

2. THE RYANS AND JONES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
FACTS NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO GRANT AN
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION.

A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the use of the subject property is: ( 1) open and
notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with
the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory
period. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006); Backman v.

Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 396, 210 P.3d 75, 81 (2009): Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,
229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003); Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62 190 P.3d 876, 881
(2008). Proof of all five elements must be by clear and convincing evidence. Backman, 147
Idaho at 396,210 P.3d at 81. Ryan and Jones did not prove all five elements.
The Backman court had an opportunity to discuss each of the five elements; stating,
"'[ e Jach element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must make findings relevant to

[5]

each element in order to sustain a judgment on appeal. Id. The Court in Backman further
stated at that the creation of a private easement by prescription is not favored under Idaho
law. Id.
a.

THE RYANS AND JONESES HAVE NOT PROVED THE OPEN ANO
NOTORIOUS ELEMENT OF THEIR CLAIM BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
Ev !DENCE.

The Court in Backman addressed the open and notorious issue first.
A use must be sufficiently open and notorious so that a
reasonable person would have discovered its occurrence. The
purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and
notorious is to give the owner of the servient tenement
knowledge and opportunity to assert his rights. Therefore, the
use must rise to a level that would provide notice to a servient
landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision over
his premises. (internal citations omitted).

Backman, 147 at 396. 210 P.3d at 81. The facts of Backman were that the use was open and
notorious for two years when logging occurred. The rematning use was essentially restricted
to hunting 1 camping and other activity similar to recreational use.

The Backman Court

determined that the recreationat type uses were not of a suCficienl open and notorious nature
to satisfy a prescriptive easement. Id.
The facts of this case are such that the use may have been open and notorious for
periods of time; when the Moaks lived on the property and since the Ryans lived on the
propeny. However, intermittent periods of time less than the prescriptive period are not long

f6)

enough to establish open and notorious use.

The other use of the road was recreation use.

Recreational use is nol sufficiently open and notorious to satisfy this element.
The Ryans and the Jones have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
use of the road was open and notorious.

Furthermore, the District Comi did not make

findings of fact that would suppoti such a conclusion.
b.

THE RYANS AND JONESES HAVE NOT PROVED THE CONTINUOUS AND
UNINTERRUPTED

ELEMENT

OF

THEIR

CLAIM

BY

CLEAR

AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

The use established by the Joneses and the Ryans was not continuous and
uninterrupted. The Court in Backman upheld the District Cowi's finding in that case that
maintaining the road periodically was not enough to meet the proof required for this element.
Baclonan, 147 Idaho at 397, 210 P.3d at 82.

The Ryans established that they have

maintained the road. However, that maintenance was not for 20 years. Prior to the Ryan's
maintenance of the road, the road was described as follows:
Road was built for logging. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 57, LL. 12-15.
The road was a rough, old logging road. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 166, LL.
14-24; p. 167, LL. 3-6.

The road was extremely rough. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 423, LL. 5-6, p.
424. LL. 4-6.

The road was just a skid trail. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 511, LL. 6-7.
The road was more of a skid trail for logging.
l 202, LL. 13-23.

[7]

Tr. Vol. 2, p.

The road was little more than a cow trail or farming road. Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 805, LL. 7-12, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 821, LL. 17-20.
The road contained a heavy growth of weeds and grass. Tr. Vol.
1, pp! 3 78, LL. 21-4.
The Ryans and the Jones have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
use of the road continuous and uninterrupted. Furthermore, the District Court did not make
findings of fact that would support such a conclusion.
c.

THE

RYANS

AND

JONESES

HAVE

NOT

PROVED,

BY

CLEAR

AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE USE WAS ADVERSE AND UNDER A
CLAIM OF RIGHT.

A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient
tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by
definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed,
the rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse
or ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual
invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. Thus, the
nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient
owner's claims to the property." The state of mind of the users
of the alleged easement is not controlling; instead, the focus is
on the nature of their use. Moreover, "mere inaction and passive
acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of
the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of the
servient tenement.''
Backman, 147 Idaho at 397-398, 210 P.3d at 82-83. (Citations omitted). The Backman court

also stated that it was proper for a district court to use presumption rules such as presumption
of public use, use in common, and wild and unenclosed lands to determine whether the
claimant had met the elements for a prescriptive easement. The wild and unenclosed lands
presumption was discussed in Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003).

[8]

Although clear and convincing proof of each of the elements
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement is generally essential
to a claim, there is a shortcut in terms of proving adverse use.
Without evidence of how the use of the property began, proof of
open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use for the
prescriptive period raises a presumption that the use was adverse
and under a claim of right. The burden then shifts to the owner of
the servient estate to demonstrate that the claimant's use was
permissive. This presumption does not apply where the claimed
easement is over wild and unenclosed lands. Rather. where the
easement alleged is over wild and unenclosed lands, there is a
rebuttable presumption that use of such lands is permissive, and
the burden is on the party asse1ting the easement to establish
adversity

Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 232, 76 P.Jd at 976.
In this case the claimed easement began over wild and unenclosed lands. Therefore,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the use of the easement is permissive. When a use begins
as a permissive use it does not ripen into an adverse.
Clifton and the Machados extensively argued the wild and unenclosed land theory.
Clifton testified that the property was wild and fairly open. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 86, LL. 17-19.
Jerry Machado 's testimony went as follows:
What was the condition of the property back then when you
went out on to it?
Just open timberland. Just no development. Nothing like that.
At the time when you were hunting the property would you have
termed it as wild?
You could probably use that term.

Tr. Vol. 1, p. 180, LL. 22-25, p. 181, LL 22-25. Terry Machado testified that the property
was open, undeveloped and wild. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 321, LL 2-25; p. 322, LL. 1-19. Kristopher

[9)

Jones stated that everything appeared to be unimproved. "No boundaries or fence lines
within that quadrant." Mr. Jones agreed the property was wild. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 400, LL. 13-25;
p. 401, LL. 1-12. Chris Thomason also admitted the property was a wild area. Tr. Vol. 1, p.

437, LL. 6-16.

Stanley McNutt's testimony was as follows:
But you've hunted on what is now, the Machado property; 1s
that correct?
I have crossed that, yes.
And that's pretty open property, isn't it.
Un-hum.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 496, LL. 18-22. Clarence Thomason testified similarly to everyone else.

There was no city water out there?
No.
No street lights?
And would you say the property was pretty wild out there?
Well, it was open to all the wild game that was out there.
Can I get your definition of wild?
What's my definition of wild? It would be undeveloped land to
where all types of critters could run on it.
Were there a lot of critters out there?
Yeah, there was lots of wild game.
In fact, you hunted a few of those wild critters, didn't you?
Yes.
Ate a few of them?
Yes.
That's just a little aside. So it was heavily timbered, too, was it
not?
Quite heavy. Yes, sir.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 558, LL. 2-23. Kevin Anderson testified that the property was open and they

would just let their cows go. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 1172-1173, LL. 13-9: p. 1175, LL. 5-22. There

[ l OJ

are ample facts in the record to support the presumption of permissive use. The Ryans and
Joneses have not rebutted that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
The District Court did not make any findings as to whether the Ryans and Joneses'
claim to an easement was under a claim of right. However, there was ample evidence from
which the District Court could have found that there was not enough proof to establish that
the use prior to the Ryans was adverse and under a claim of right.
d.

THE

RYANS

AND

JONESES

HAVE

NOT

PROVED

THE

ACTUAL

OR

IMPUTED KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE HOLDER BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

The Backman Corni discussed the law surround the fourth element of adverse
prescription as follows:
Generally, where a claimant establishes open, notorious,
continuous and uninterrupted use under a claim of right for the
statutory period, knowledge of the owner may be presumed.
However, there are special considerations regarding notice to
the owner when the claimant's use of the subject property is
shared with the general public:
Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which adverse
claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the
general public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive easement
has generally been held impossible. In such a case, the claimant
must perform some act whereby the adverse nature of the claim
is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient estate.
Backrnan, 147 Idaho at 389-399, 210 P.3d at 83-84. Court in Backman determined that using

the road for berry picking, hunting, gathering firewood, and other recreational activities was
not enough to clearly indicate an adverse claim to the Respondents. Backman, 14 7 Idaho at

[ l Jl

399, 210 P.3d at 84. Similarly in this case, Clarence Thomason's use of the road for hunting,
horse riding and snowmobiling does not indicate an adverse claim. Neither does use of the
road that Clifton witness; by the occasional hunters, campers and hippies. R. Vol. 2. p. 339.
The Ryans and the Jones have not shown by clear and convincing evidence any of the
elements necessary for a prescriptive easement right. Furthermore, the District Court did not
make findings of fact that would support such a conclusion.

e.

THE

RYA~S

STATUTORY

AND

JONESES

PERIOD

HAVE

ELEMENT

OF

NOT

PROVED

THEIR

THE

CLAIM

BY

USE

FOR

CLEAR

THE
AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

The statutory period required to claim a prescriptive easement is governed by Idaho
Code

~

5-203 Section 5-203 provides:
No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery
of the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appears
that the plaintiff: his ancestor, predecessor or grantor, was
seized or possessed of the property in question within twenty
(20) years before the commencement of the action J.C. §5-203.

The Complaint was filed in District Court on September 27, 2007. Therefore, the Ryans and
Joneses would've had to have proved the above elements since September 27, 1987 or prior.
Joneses' property is undeveloped to this day.
purchased his property in 1971.

Def's Trial Ex. F.

Tr. Vol. 1, p. 340, LL. 2-4.

He

Due to the undeveloped nature of

Joneses' prope1iy, he has not used the disputed road continuously, open and notoriously for a
period of twenty (20) years. Jones relies on the use of the road through his property to the
Ryans' property to make his prescriptive claim.

[ 12]

However, the Ryans did not purchase their property until 1989. Def's Trial Ex. J.
They did not move on to the property until 1993. Tr. Vol., 2, p. 831, LL. 6-13. Therefore, to
get to the 20 year period they must be able to tack the use of another on to their own. In
1984 or 1985 no one was living on the Ryans' parcel. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 803, LL. 12-17 &p. 804.
LL. 11-16; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 80 7, LL. 13-15.

The Ryans purchased the property from Jennifer

Mensch (formerly Jennifer Moak). Def's Trial Ex. J The Moaks purchased the property in
1976.

Def's Trial Ex. RRR. Even if the Moaks used the road open, notoriously and

continuously from 1976 to 1985, that is not 20 years.
Based on the above facts, there was at least some use of the road from 1993 to 2007.
However, from 1984/1985 to 1993 there was no open, notorious or continuous use of the
road.

The unbroken or continuous 20 year requirement cannot be met. The Ryans and

Joneses cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that road was used for the statutory
period. Furthermore, the District Court did not make findings of fact that would support
such a conclusion.

B.APPELLANTS'REPLY.
1. AN EXPRESS EASEMENT DOES NOT EXIST IN FAVOR
OF THE RYANS AND JONESES.

"In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the easement
is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the circumstances in
existence at the time the easement was granted.'' Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 246 P.3d

[ 13)

391, 395 (2010).

In Coward, the court determined that easement language that stated,

"provided, [Daughters J, his heirs and assigns shall have a permanent right of way over and
across twelve feet on the east side or end of said lots for the purpose of an alley" was
unambiguous. Id. The easement benefited lot 11 and burdened lots 1 and 2. Id The easement
was unambiguous because it clearly identified the dominant and servient estates and the
location of the easement.
An express easement benefiting the Ryans and the Joneses would have had to have
been created by Timberland at the time it transferred Clifton's property to him. Clifton's
deed contains no such easement. Clifton's deed provides in pertinent part as follows:
SUBJECT TO: Easements of record, which allows joint useage
(sic) of a road over and across the described property and
adjacent property which runs with the land, for ingress and
egress from the described property as recorded November 6,
1970 in Book 154 of Miscellaneous Records, page 394, records
of Benewah County, Idaho, being Document No. 119025.
Pl. 's Trial Ex. 1.

The Ryans and Jones argue that the November 6, 1970 deed whereas Promised Land
conveyed the subject property to Timberland, the Road Easement, the Timberland sales
literature, the language in the Clifton deed, and the language in the Ryans' and the Jones'
deeds creates an express easement across the Machado driveway benefiting the Ryans and
the Joneses. Each of these arguments is further addressed below.
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a.

THE DEED FROM PROMISED LAND TO TIMBERLAND AND THEl

19025

ROAD EASEMENT DO NOT CREATE AN F:XPRESS EASEMENT ACROSS THE
CLIFTON AND MACHADO BENEFITING THE RYANS AND THE JONES.

The deed from Promised I "and to Timberland does not reference an easement at all.

Def's Trial Ex. C. Therefore, there is no express easement on its face.

The 119025 road

easement specifically describes an easement that is a logging road located in sections 29 and
30 but not section 19. There is no express easement in the 119025 document or the Promised
Land deed that expressly grants an easement through the Machado/Clifton prope1iy to the
Ryan/Jones property. The Machado/Clifton property and the Ryan/Jones property are all
contained in section 19.

b.

THE TIMBERLAND SALES LITERATURF: DOES NOT CREATE AN EXPRESS
EASEMENT

ACROSS

THE

CLIFTON

AND

MACHADO

BENEFITING

THE

RY ANS AND THE JONES.

Idaho recognizes a common law dedication of land for private use.

Ponderosa

Homesite Lot Owners, 143 Idaho 407, 409, 146 P.3d 673, 675 (2006). The elements for a
public common law dedication and a private common law dedication are the same: (1) an
offer by the owner clearly and unequivocally indicating intent to dedicate the land and (2) an
acceptance of the offer. id. Neither of these elements is met in this case.
The first element of this test is met by the act of recording or filing a subdivision plat
depicting the specific areas subject to the dedication so long as there is clear and unequivocal
indication the owner intends to dedicate the land as depicted. id.

The Timberland sales

literature was never recorded. Fu1ihermore, there is no indication that the sales literature was
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an unequivocal indication of Timberland's intent to develop its property as depicted in the
sales literature. The sales literature was nothing more than a sales person's puffing about the
product it had for sale. It would be no different than if Timberland had developed artist
renderings of each lot developed with a log cabin and a road and swimming pool.
Timberland wasn't selling the log cabin, road and swimming pool; it was selling a vacant lot
with possibilities. See also, Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152
P.3d 575(2007)(There is nothing in sales materials that indicate an immediate grant of
easement rights.)
The Ryans and Joneses appear to argue that the mere fact that Timberland recorded a
survey (Def's Ex. D.) with road drawn it in a similar location as Flat Creek Road is enough to
constitute a recording of a plat depicting a dedication. Exhibit D is of no consequence in the
determination of whether the Ryans and Joneses have an easement. First, Exhibit D was
created and recorded when Timberland no longer owned the Machado/Clifton properties.
Timberland had nothing to give away or to dedicate related to the Machado/Clifton
properties.

A dedication is when and owner indicates intent to dedicate.

There is no

theory of law that allows a party to create an easement for his or her benefit over another
party's land simply by recording a survey of a road that exists on the second patty's land.
Second, the dedication has to be clear and unequivocal. Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners,
143 Idaho at, 409. 146 P.3d at 675. A penciled in dotted line in a less than specific area on
the map can hardly be called a unequivocal dedication.
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The second part of the test in this case cannot be met. There can be no acceptance
\Vhen there is no offer.

The offer is accepted when lhe offer is acted upon and lots are

purchased with reference to the plat filed by the offeror. Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners,
l43 at 409, l46 P.Jd at 675. The deeds issued by Timberland do not reference the sales
literature nor was the sates literature recorded.

At the time of closing the sales contract

including any sales literature were merged tnto the deed and the purchasers were left with
nothing but what was contained in their deeds. There is no evidence ot· an express easement
by dedication in this case.

c.

THE LANGUAGE IN TH£ CLIFTON 0E£D 00£S NOT CR£ATE AN EXPRESS
EASEMENT ACROSS THE CLIFTON AND MACHADO BENEFITING THE
RYANS AND THE JONES.

The Clifton deed easement language unambiguously sets forth the location of the
easement as the easement located on the 1 l 9025 document. The easement language also
unambiguously sets forth the dominant and servient estates.

The dominant estate is the

Clit1on property. The easement is for ingress and egress to and from the described property
(the Clifton property).

The servient estate is the remaining property still owned by

Timberland at that time in sections 29 and 30 where the 119026 road \vas located. Nowhere
in the easement language does it reference burdening Clifton's property with easement to
property in section 19 to the west of Clifton's property. No such easement was created. This
is consistent with Coward Court 's conclusion, in which it determined that, ·'the plain text of
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the deed mentions nothing about an easement benefiting lot 2, so the document itself
provides no basis for an express easement." Coward, 246 P.3d at 396.

Furthermore,

an

express easement "does not grant rights in the easement to the holders of parcels other than
the dominant estate.'' Coward, 246 P.3d at 39, citing, Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake. 143
Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456, 459 (2006). Clifton's easement does not create an easement in
the remote parcels now owned by Ryan and Jones.
d.

THE LANGUAGE IN Tl-IE RYANS' AND JONES' DEED DOES NOT CREATE
AN

EXPRESS

EASEMENT

ACROSS

THE

CLIFTON

AND

MACHADO

BENEFITING THE RYANS AND THE JONES.

The Ryans and Joneses cannot grant themselves and easement across property they do
not own. None of the Ryans' or the Joneses' predecessors in interest could have granted the
Ryans and the Joneses and easement across Machado's and Clifton's property except for
Timberland; however.. once Timberland deed the Clifton property to Clifton, it was too late.
A seller of property cannot grant easement rights over property that it does not own. Capstar,
143 Idaho at 708, 152 P.3d at 579.
The language in the Machados' deed also does not create an express easement.
Clifton indicated that his intent was not to give an easement to the Ryan or Jones property.
Furthermore, the Court has said that where language of easement is vague, no express
easement can exist. See, Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003).
The District Court did not make findings of fact sufficient to support the law of an
express easement. The District Court's decision in this regard must be reversed.
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2. AN IMPLIED EASEMENT BY NECESSITY DOES NOT
EXIST

The Ryans and Jones have not submitted enough evidence, as a matter of law, to
establish each of the three elements required for an implied easement by necessity.
Specifically, the necessity did not exist at the time of severance and there is no great present
need for the necessity.
a.

THE NECESSITY DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF SEVERANCE.

At the time of severance, there were no roads. Timberland could have accessed any
of its property from the easement it did have (the 119025 Road) through sections 29 and 30.
Timberland hired Dickinson to put a road into the prope1iy it owned in section 19. This was
after the Clifton parcel was sold. Dickinson did put the road in, at that time. Timberland
could access all of its property without going through the Clifton property.

Timberland

could access all of its remaining section 19 properties from Flat Creek Road. The Ryans'
and Joneses' parcels were aJl one parcel at that time with Flat Creek Road going through the
southern part of the parcel. When Timberland sold Joneses' parcel to him, the access had to
be from Flat Creek Road through the Ryan property. Flat Creek Road is a private road from
a public road. Furthermore, the Ryan property was the only that Timberland owned at that
time. The Ryan property was the only property that Timberland could encumber with an
easement. It wasn't necessary for Jones' parcel to be access from Clifton's property.
b. THERE IS NO GREAT PRESENT NEED FOR THE NECESSITY.
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The Ryans and Joneses argue that the Joneses property is landlocked without the
Machado's driveway.

This simply is not true. The Joneses have an easement available

through the Ryans' property. The Ryans have said as much. Jones' property is undeveloped.
Jones is going have to have a build a driveway to his residence no matter what when you
decides to build. (The Machados driveway only touches the very corner of Jones' property.)
Jones might as well build the driveway across the easement that he has, the one through the
Ryans' property.

There is no present necessity for Jones to go through Clifton's and

Machados' property.
The Ryans have no great present necessity for the easement. The Ryans created any
necessity they may have by spending money to improve a road that did not belong to them.
The Ryans could have just as easily created the proposed alternative road without any more
expense than they incurred working on the Machados' driveway. With regards to money
spent improving the Machados driveway, Mr. Ryan testified as follows:
I installed water bars on Shamrock Lane to control the water
runoff. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 855, LL. 2-3.
They were two by sixes sandwiched over some rubber belting.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 855, LL. 11-12.
A major thing we did was remove material that were buried in
the road by logging large limbs and branches that we buried in
the road and covered with dirt. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 856, LL. l-3.
Initially I just took a chain saw and trimmed them off, but they
kept coming up. So we eventually brought a Caterpillar in and
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literally dug the road out and removed that material and
replaced it with rock. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 858, LL. 19-23.
I did lease a front-end loader that was located in a rock pit on
another road up there. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 859, LL 3-5.
Removing material that was probably about 300 feet. Tr. Vol. 2,
p. 859, LL. 10-11.
And if I understood your testimony correctly, you put in fill
material?
Yes, sir. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 859, LL. 12-14.
The project went on for probably five days. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 859,
LL. 23-24.
And we ran two trucks as hard as we could run them for those
days. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 860, LL. 5-6.
16 loads a day for four or five days. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 860 LL. 9-10.
Mr. Gottschalk's truck was a ten size, 12-yard truck. And mine
was a four-yard truck, four cubic yards. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 860 LL.
13-14.
I put one or two dump truck loads of gravel on the road each
year. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 861, LL. 12-13.
I normally hired Winhoff Construction Tr. Vol. 2, p. 861, L. 22.
I rented that front-end loader from when we were doing the
repairs after the loggers' work. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 862, LL. 6-8.
Those checks are equipment rental for a front-end loader that
dips into the rock pit that we used to load our dump trucks with.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 863, LL. 10-12.
I had initiated a contractor to replace the pole power line by a
private contractor. Tr. Vol.2, p. 867, LL. 2-3.
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He brought his D4 Cat down to prepare my home site. And he
did some ditt work to help further develop the driveway to my
property. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 868, LL. 10-12.
The new road proposed 1200 yards of fill. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1249, LL. 20-21. Ryans argue that
this is too much work to expect them to do in building a road. However. by Mr. Ryans own
estimate, he put between 1024 and 1280 3 yards of fill into the Machados' driveway. The
Ryans argue that it is unreasonable to require them to move a power pole. However, Ryans
moved the power pole in the first instance. The Ryans further argue that the proposed road is
too steep. However, the proposed road is less steep than the road they are currently using.
Mr. Pugh did not testify that the proposed road would be 30-35% slope. He testified that the
side slope of the land would be 30-35%.
You're looking at about a 30-35% slope. That's the side slope
that is coming off. But your road would not be coming in that
way.
Okay
Your road would be coming off here. And then it wi II maintain a
fairly flat grade around. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1263, LL. 6-12.

And are you familiar with the, you know, the grade with regards
to Shamrock Lane as it goes down into their homestead?
Yes, I am.
And what's the grade there?
It's the steepest part I shot, 15 percent.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1276, LL. 3-8.
And I think your letter states it was 3

Mr. Ryan estimated that they made 16 trips per day for 4 or 5 days with a 12 yard capacity truck and a 4 yard
capacity truck. That equates to roughly 128 dump truck loads, opposed to Mr. Pugh's estimate that new road would
take roughly 120 dump truck loads. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1299, II. 1-2.

[22]

It was 485 feet, if I'm not mistaken.
Okay. And with regards to that, what would be the incline as it
- the average incline? The slope of that road?
Average on that would be - well, I figured it's between 8 and 10
percent; so 9 11:? , 9 percent would be an average.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1279, LL. I 5-22.

The Ryans are currently using a driveway with a 15% grade. Tr. Vol. 2. p. I 276, ll. 7-8. The
proposed new road would have a grade between 8 and 10%. An owner of property cannot
create the necessity by his or her own actions. Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 80,665 P.2d
1081, 1090 (Ct. App. 1983). At the time the Ryans developed their property and at the time
of the severance, access to the Ryan and Jones property could have just as easily been
accomplished from Flat Creek Road as from the logging road that Clifton used to log his
property. Furthermore, Timberland directed the location of Flat Creek Road. Timberland
could have just as easily directed the location of Flat Creek Road to be better accommodating
for a driveway to the Ryan and Jones property. The District Court should have weighed the
perspective rights of the parties.
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
WIDTH OF THE EASEMENT.

A grant of an easement, indefinite as to width must impose no greater burden than is
necessary. Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 (2005). The
court should consider the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was given. Id
If the Court believes that Ryans and Joneses' theory of the case, the easement was given in
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1971.

The road was a logging road that people would not even drive in the wintertime.

There was no 15 foot snow removal path at that time. The Court has determined that there is
a difference between the use permitted and the physical dimension of the easement. Argosy,
141 Idaho at 573, 114 P.3d at 131. An increase in width does more than merely increase the
burden upon the servient estate; it envelops additional lands. Id The Ryans and Joneses
should not be allowed to envelop additional lands. The 15 foot snov./ removal path is not
supported under the law.

IV. CONCLUSION
The facts found by the District Court are insufficient to satisfy the legal requirements
of an express easement. an implied easement by necessity or the width of the casement. The
evidence presented below is insufficient to satisfy the legal requirements of implied easement
by prior use or easement by prescription.

Therefore. no easement exists.

The District

Court's ruling should be reversed.

Dated this 12th day of July, 2011.

A'ttorney for Appellants/Cross Respondents.
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